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Abstract
Computer science researchers in the programming languages and formal verification
communities have produced a variety of automated tools and techniques for assisting formal
reasoning tasks. However, while there exist notable successes in utilizing these tools to
develop safe and secure software and hardware, both leading-edge advances and basic
techniques (such as model checking, state space search, type checking, logical inference
and verification, computation of congruence closures, non-interference enforcement, and
so on) remain underutilized by large populations of end-users that may benefit from them
when they engage in formal reasoning tasks within their own application domains. This
may be in part because (1) these tools and techniques are not readily accessible to end-
users who are not experts in formal systems or are simply not aware of what is available
and how it can be utilized, and (2) these tools and techniques are only valuable when
used in conjunction with one another and with appropriate domain-specific libraries and
databases.
Motivated by these circumstances, we present our ongoing efforts, built on earlier work
in developing user-friendly formal verification tools, to develop a platform for assembling,
instantiating, and deploying user-friendly, interactive, integrated formal reasoning environ-
ments that can assist users engaged in routine domain-specific formal reasoning tasks in
application domains. This infrastructure encompasses a programming language, compilers,
and other tools for building up from components, instantiating with domain-specific formal
content, and finally delivering such environments in the form of ready-to-use web-based
applications that can run entirely within a standard web browser. We describe current ef-
forts to use this platform to instantiate an environment the application domain of correct
network protocol design.
1 Introduction
Computer science researchers in the programming languages and formal verification commu-
nities have produced a wide variety of automated tools and techniques for assisting formal
reasoning tasks. However, while there exist notable successes in utilizing these tools to develop
safe and secure software and hardware, both leading-edge advances and basic techniques (such
as model checking, state space search, type checking, logical inference and verification, compu-
tation of congruence closures, non-interference enforcement, and so on) remain underutilized
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by large populations of end-users that may benefit from them when they engage in formal
reasoning tasks within their own application domains. These populations include students and
instructors, researchers, and experts working in particular application domains. This state of
affairs may be a consequence of the fact that (1) many existing tools and techniques are not
readily accessible to end-users who are not experts in formal systems or are not familiar with
what is available and how it may be used, and that (2) these tools and techniques only be-
come practically valuable when they can be used in conjunction with one another and with
appropriate domain-specific libraries to engage in routine formal reasoning tasks.
Motivated by the current state of affairs, we present our ongoing efforts, built on earlier
work in developing user-friendly formal verification tools [20, 19, 12], to develop a general-
purpose platform and infrastructure for defining, implementing, instantiating, and delivering
user-friendly, interactive, integrated formal reasoning environments (henceforward we will refer
to these as environments for concision) that can assist users engaging in routine domain-specific
formal reasoning tasks. This infrastructure encompasses a programming language, compilers,
user-interface features, and other tools for building up from components, instantiating with
domain-specific formal content, and finally delivering such environments in the form of ready-
to-use web-based applications that can run entirely within a standard web browser.
In this work we begin to define what we consider to be a minimal collection of tools and
conventions that are needed to implement and support an accessible integrated environment
for a chosen application domain. In doing so, we develop prototypes of practical tools and con-
ventions for this underlying infrastructure. Furthermore, we begin to develop a framework and
context in which to raise new questions and problems associated with defining and implementing
accessible integrated environments.
Accessibility of formal reasoning tools and practical integration of such tools can be treated
as two complementary but orthogonal issues, and these issues can be addressed separately.
However, we believe (and attempt to illustrate in this work) that addressing them simultane-
ously compels each effort to reinforce the other. Also focusing on the accessibility of integrated
components rather than only on the integration of the components leads us to create tools to
support fast and unique implementations of integrated components that enable user-friendly
and practical delivery over the web of the resulting automated formal assistance capabilities.
Likewise, also focusing on the integration of components rather than only on the accessibility
of individual algorithms or tools leads us to build general-purpose interface features that are
not necessarily limited to the idiosyncratic strengths and weaknesses of particular tools and
techniques (though they may expose and let users make tradeoffs between different tools based
on their strengths and weaknesses). Thus, such interface features can be used for combina-
tions of underlying components that may have different automated assistance capabilities and
characteristics.
To illustrate more concretely our vision and to begin evaluating our efforts, we an applica-
tion domain in which end-users benefit not just by having an environment with an accessible
interface, but also by having the ability to integrate multiple tools and techniques: safe and
correct network protocol design.
2 Motivating Examples
We present several examples, drawn from the application domain of protocol design, illustrating
how an accessible integrated formal reasoning environment may be used within this application
domain. We do so to illustrate some of the key features that an environment should possess in
order to support design and automated formal analysis of protocols.
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For each example, we present the definition of the protocol and one or more properties
that a protocol design may possess. A protocol designer may wish to check or confirm that a
protocol design possesses this property using one or more automated or semi-automated formal
reasoning assistance tools or techniques. In the final example in Section 2.3, we also present
a possible language to be used by end-users to specify the protocol and the properties to be
checked automatically using an integrated environment.
2.1 Stable Paths Problem (SPP) and Variants
The stable-paths problem captures the basic functionality of the BGP routing protocol. In
the SPP, there is a common destination, for instance v0, and all nodes exchange their current
path in order to reach v0. Considering local policies, each node chooses the best path for itself
among those paths advertised by neighbors. Let G = (V,E) be a simple, undirected graph
where v = {0, 1, 2, ..., n} is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges. Node 0 is the destination
or origin of the graph, where all the nodes want to reach it and find the best path to v0. For
any node u, peers(u) = {w|{u,w} ∈ E} is the set of peers for u. A path is either the empty
path, , or a sequence of nodes, (vkvk−1...v1v0), k ≥ 0, such that ∀i, k ≥ i > 0, {vi, vi−1} ∈ E.
For each v ∈ V , Pv denotes the set of permitted paths starting from v to the v0. If
P = (vvk...v10) is in Pv, then the node vk is the next hop of path P . P =
⋃
P v.
For each v ∈ V , there is a non-negative, integer-values ranking function λv, defined over P v,
which represents how node v ranks its permitted paths. If P1, P2 ∈ Pv and λv(P1) < λv(P2),
then p2 is preferred over P1. Let Λ = {λv|v ∈ V − {0}}.
An instance of the Stable Paths Problem, S = (G,P,Λ), is a graph together with the per-
mitted paths at each node and the ranking functions for each node. Let S = (G,P,Λ) be an
instance of the Stable Paths Problem. A path assignment is a function pi that maps each node
to a permitted path pi(u) ∈ Pu. All possible permitted paths at u ( choices(pi, u)) is defined to be
choices(pi, u) =
{ {(u, v)pi(v)|{u, v} ∈ E}⋂Pu, (u 6= 0)
{(0)}, o.w.
This set represents all possible permitted paths at u that can be formed by extending the
paths assigned to the peers of u. Given a node u, suppose that W is a subset of the permitted
paths Pu such that each path in W has a distinct next hop. Then the best path in W is defined
to be
best(W,u) =
{
P ∈Wwith maximal λu(P ), (W 6= )
, o.w.
2.1.1 Properties.
The path assignment pi is stable at node u if:
pi(u) = best(choices(pi, u), u).
2.2 Chord
Chord is a peer-to-peer distributed hash table (DHT) protocol consisting of N nodes, which
support one operation: given a key, it maps the key to a node. Each node in a Chord network
has a unique identifier which is an m-bit hash of its IP address. The nodes are arranged in a
circle that has at most N = 2m nodes and every node has a successor and predecessor pointer.
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The successor is the next node in the identifier circle and the predecessor is the previous node.
Since the successor or predecessor nodes may leave the network, each node acquires a list
of logN extra successors during the maintenance of Chord network. When a node joins the
network, it contacts an existing node (the auxiliary node), requests the successor of that node
and updates its successor. It also asks its successor for the successor’s predecessor and sets
its own predecessor to that node. During stabilization, a newly joined node will complete its
full successor list. After stabilization, the node will notify its successor of its identity. In the
notified node, if the notifier is closer than its own predecessor, the notified node will update its
predecessor to notifier. In fact, all nodes call stabilize and notify periodically to update their
list. If the successor of a node changes during stabilization (because of other nodes which left
or just joined the network), the notification event will be invoked. Hence the successor node
will be aware of its new predecessor.
When a node fails, it is no longer responsive to queries and hence it is dead. When a node
becomes aware of a dead member, it will update the corresponding successor pointer to the
immediate active node. Failures can create gaps and holes in the network. The purpose of the
stabilization and notification events is to maintain the Chord ring in an ideal condition and
circumvent these holes and gaps. An ideal instantiation of a Chord network of nodes should
satisfy a collection of invariants.
2.2.1 Invariants
Valid Successor List. For any pairs of nodes w and v, if w’s successor list bypasses v, this
means that v is not in the successor list of w’s immediate predecessors.
Ordered Appendages. In an appendage, all of the nodes should be ordered based on their
identifiers.
Ordered Merges. When merging into the Chord ring, the merging appendage should be
placed at the right position in the ring based on the identifiers.
2.2.2 Invariants Required for Correctness
At Least One Ring. In a Chord network, there should be at list one ring of nodes, and all
of nodes are reachable from each other in that ring.
At Most One Ring. There should always be at most one ring in the network and the nodes
should not break apart into two or more appendages.
Ordered Ring. All of the nodes in the ring are at the right position. In an other words,
nodes are ordered based on their identifiers.
Connected Appendages. During the lifetime of Chord ring, an appendage stays connected
to the ring.
2.2.3 Correctness
A Chord ring is correct if none of the aforementioned invariants are violated during lifetime of
network.
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2.3 Leadership Election
Suppose a protocol designer is defining a simple leadership election protocol over a unidirectional
ring of processes, each of which has a unique numerical identifier. The process with the highest
identifier should be elected leader at the end of a protocol execution. Each process first sends
its own ID to its successor, then uses the following algorithm whenever it receives an ID from
its predecessor (see Figure 1).
At start, send own ID to successor
Each round, send one ID in pool to successor
If ID is received from predecessor, compare to own ID:
Higher: add to ID pool
Lower: drop
Equal: elect self as leader and stop sending messages
Figure 1: An example of a protocol to elect the process with the highest ID in a set of processes.
While a number of different properties can be checked automatically, consider two classes
that the designer is interested in: relational, global properties and temporal/concurrency prop-
erties. The Alloy Analyzer [15], a model checker which accepts models and constraints written
in the Alloy [13] language, can be used to checker the former. SPIN [11], an explicit-state model
checker that accepts models written in Promela and properties specified in Linear Temporal
Logic (LTL) can be used to check the latter.
The correctness properties the designer wants to check using Alloy are:
• Is at most one process elected as leader?
• Is at least one process elected as leader?
• Is the process with the highest identifier always elected leader?
• Can a process ever have no IDs to send, but not be the leader?
The correctness properties the designer wants to check using SPIN are:
• Are deadlocks possible?
• Once a process is elected, are no other processes elected at any future time?
• Once a process is elected, is it elected at all future times?
The integrated environment should provide a standard syntax for protocol designers that can
be used to write down both the definition of a protocol and formulas describing its properties.
Any protocol definition can be translated to both an equivalent Alloy syntax, and an equivalent
SPIN syntax. Any formula specified by the designer can be converted to Alloy syntax, SPIN
syntax, or both, depending on whether its structure fits each system. The above protocol,
written in a syntax accommodated by the environment, is presented in Figure 2.
The two Links denote buffered message channels of size 1, which define the behavior of the
-> operator when it is used between a process’ predecessor and itself or itself and its successor,
respectively. If a Link is not explicitly defined, -> defaults to synchronous message passing.
The act keyword denotes labeled, guarded actions that a protocol may take. The final
action, for example, may be taken only if leader is true. Note that there is no particular
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class Process:
id: Pid
predecessor: Process
Link(predecessor, self, 1)
successor: Process
Link(self, successor, 1)
pool: set Pid
leader: Bool
init: id -> successor
act send(not leader):
some Pid in pool -> successor
act receive(predecessor -> rec_id):
if (rec_id < id):
elif (rec_id = id): leader = True
elif (rec_id > id): pool.add(rec_id)
act final(leader): accept
invariant Ring:
all p in Proccess:
all q in Process in p.successor*
invariant PredSucc:
all p,q in Proccess:
q = p.successor implies p=q.predecessor
Figure 2: Leadership election in a unidirectional ring
semantics associated with the case that multiple guards are true simultaneously. Different
formal tools handle this case in different ways, or may not even have a concept of concurrency.
The invariant keyword introduces required structure over the successor and predecessor
pointers of a process. Ring enforces the topological constraint of the protocol (a unidirectional
ring), and should be read as “for all processes p, any process q is in the transitive closure (e.g.,
reachable via a finite chaining) of its successor pointer”. PredSucc enforces the requirement
that predecessor is the inverse of successor, and should be read as “If q is the successor of p,
then p is the predecessor of q”.
It is important to note that the above protocol model may not be fully expressible in all
formal tools. Alloy, for example, has no concept of buffered channels, and would model message
passing as changes to relations between identifiers and atoms in the Process set. In this case,
any translation performed by the environment would be accompanied by an explicit message
informing the user of the loss in detail.
The properties that the designer is interested in checking are expressed in a similar manner
to invariants, as presented in Figure 3. Note that the syntax used in expressing these properties
(largely first-order logic with some temporal operators) is to be translated, if possible, into the
formal logic(s) supported by the component systems integrated within the environment. Finally,
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# At all times, is at most one process eventually elected as
leader? all p,q in Proccess: p.leader implies no q.leader
# At all times, is at least one process eventually elected as leader?
all p in Proccess: always eventually some p.leader
# Is the process with the highest identifier always elected leader?
all p,q in Process: p.leader implies no q: q.id > p.id
# Can a process ever have no IDs to send, but not be the leader?
some p in Process: p.pool={} and not p.leader
# Once a process is elected, is it elected at all future times?
all p in Process: p.leader implies always p.leader
# Once a process is elected, are no other processes elected
# at any future time?
all p,q in Process: p.leader implies never q.leader
#Are deadlocks possible?
some p in Process: always blocked
Figure 3: Protocol properties to be checked
the deadlock property makes use of the blocked keyword. This denotes a state in which the
process is either unable to act (i.e., no action guard is true) or is waiting on a blocking operation
(e.g., sending a message on a link with a full buffer). Our infrastructure will translate as many
of the above properties as possible to both Alloy and SPIN. Once verification is complete, the
model checkers’ results can be presented as counterexamples or verified statements to the user.
3 Infrastructure for Instantiating Accessible Integrated
Environments
We propose an infrastructure for implementing, instantiating, and delivering an accessible in-
tegrated formal reasoning environment. This infrastructure is comprised of a collection of
components that support the tasks that must be performed by three possible user roles (actual
users may have more than one role): (1) formal systems experts who implement automated
formal verification and analysis algorithms, as well as translators for underlying formal tools;
(2) application domain expert administrators who instantiate libraries, decide which compo-
nents and libraries are available to end-users in the environment at any given time, and authors
content that may put into context the tasks in which the end-user may engage (e.g., homework
assignments, tutorials, documentation, and so on); and (3) end-users who use the environment
to engage in formal reasoning tasks. The overall organization is presented in Figure 4.
Formal Systems Experts and Component Implementation. It is the responsibility of
formal systems experts to provide implementations of common formal analysis and verification
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Figure 4: Overall organization of infrastructure.
algorithms (e.g., monomorphic type checking, congruence closure computation, resolution, uni-
fication, and so on), as well as appropriate translations for external systems or components
(e.g., translations of a particular syntax for protocols and protocol properties to an appropriate
Alloy or SPIN syntax). In order to support formal systems experts in this task, it is necessary
to provide a language that: (1) allows them to easily define a standard definition for expressions
(formulas and terms) for a particular environment (parsers are generated automatically); (2)
allows them to specify algorithms that operate on these formulas; and (3) allows them to define
algorithms that are interdependent and can invoke one another.
All component algorithms and translations must be transformations that are defined on a
subset of the expression space supported by the environment. Any or all of the algorithms can
then be applied to all subexpressions of any expression tree parsed from the formal argument
provided by the user as input. Each subexpression can then be annotated with the results of
applying various components to that subexpression, as illustrated in Figure 6. Environment
implementers can then combine various interface features to display this information to users in
different ways (including formats that are accompanied by widgets that allow users to explore
or filter the results).
Because the definition of any component algorithm is allowed to invoke any other algorithm,
it is possible to construct a dependency graph between component algorithms, such as the one
illustrated in Figure 5. If the dependency graph is a DAG, it is possible to provide an ordering
for algorithms that ensures convergence. Otherwise, it is necessary to either allow the algorithms
to iterate until convergence or specify a bound on the number of iterations.
Application Domain Experts and Instantiation. It is the job of the application domain
expert administrator to instantiate a library of formal facts that will be seen and can be used
by the end-user in constructing formal arguments, and to provide other content or documen-
tation that may incorporate examples of formal arguments. Off-the-shelf open source content
management systems (CMS) such as Drupal and MediaWiki can be extended to support these
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Figure 5: Example of a component algorithm dependency graph.
constraint
solver∀x ∈ Z
>
⇒
> >
x+ 1 10x
∀y ∈ Z
3 1
∧
true
evaluation
algorithm true
model
checker true on {−100, . . . , 100}
Figure 6: Abstract syntax tree for “(∀y ∈ Z, 3 > 1) ∧ (∀x ∈ Z, (x > 0 ⇒ x + 1 > 1))” with
multiple values (produced by different components) for some subexpressions.
tasks. The current state of these features has been addressed in our earlier work [20, 19].
End-users and a Web-based Interactive Environment. End-users can use any standard
browser capable of running JavaScript applications to run the integrated environment. From
the end-user’s perspective, the environment provides a way to input automatically verifiable
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formal arguments using a conventional syntax similar to that of LATEX. Within a particular
environment instantiation, the functionality provided by the integrated components is exposed
using a variety of JavaScript visualization widgets that include:
• friendly, formatted output of the formal argument, including highlighting of syntactic and
logical errors, or other properties derived through automated analysis;
• lists of formal expressions, including the propositions available in the library, facts derived
by one or more component algorithms, and translations of the input into syntaxes for
particular underlying systems and tools;
• interactive controls for starting and stopping inference, evaluation, enumeration, and
verification components that have been implemented to allow partial results.
4 Related and Future Work
This work incorporates ideas and techniques from multiple disciplines and areas of research.
We review related work that shares one of two relevant features with this work: usability and
accessibility of automated and semi-automated formal reasoning tools and techniques, and use
of multiple automated and semi-automated formal reasoning tools and techniques in conjunction
with another to accomplish formal reasoning tasks in a specific application domain.
Practical Usability and Accessibility of Automated Formal Systems. This work aims
to address the disincentives to utilizing automated formal reasoning assistance systems by
integrating multiple systems within an accessible environment. We share motivation with, are
inspired by, and incorporate ideas from related efforts to address practical usability in the formal
systems communities. Some aim to provide interfaces that have a familiar syntax [2, 17, 27, 24];
some aim to make optional the need to provide explicit references to the formal facts being used
within the individual steps of a formal argument [1, 5, 25]; some aim to eliminate steep learning
curves [3, 14, 6]; some aim to reduce the logistical difficulties of utilizing automated formal
reasoning assistance systems [16, 14]. We are inspired by search mechanisms for libraries of
formal facts [7, 4, 9] and programming language constructs [22], as well as keyword-based lookup
mechanisms for programming environments [10, 21]. Providing the functionality of a formal
reasoning environment within a browser is a goal that has been adopted by some projects [16],
though that work focuses on delivering the look and functionality of an existing proof assistant.
Use of Multiple Automated Formal Systems in Conjunction. This work seeks to
provide an infrastructure for integrating and automating multiple formal tools. We draw on
previous work in the model checking community, from which there has been substantial interest
in automating the translation of a model to multiple formal systems. PRISM [18] draws on
numeric methods for linear system solving, as well as both symbolic and explicit state model
checking libraries, to check properties of probabilistic systems. The Symbolic Analysis Labo-
ratory (SAL) [23] is a suite of formal methods for checking properties of concurrent systems,
including multiple model checkers, a type checker, and several simulation tools. The AV-
VANTSSAR project [26] is a platform for protocol security analysis, incorporating constraint
solving, symbolic model checking, refinement libraries, and automated interaction with the
Isabelle theorem prover.
Cryptol [8] is a domain-specific language and tool suite that provides automated verification
capabilities for cryptographic algorithms. In Cryptol, verification can be performed in a fully-
automated manner, in which modern off-the-shelf SAT and SMT solvers are used to perform
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the verification, or in a semi-automated manner, in which the Cryptol-written theorems are
translated into Isabelle/HOL to be manually constructed by the user. The Cryptol tool suite
allows system designers to experiment their programs as their designs evolve, and provides
them with the capability of generating C, C++, Haskell software implementations, or VHDL
and Verilog HDL hardware implementations.
Our work is distinguished from the above by a stronger emphasis on accessibility for non-
expert end-users, on delivery of functionality over the web, and on providing feedback for high-
level partial formal arguments. We also explicitly address the task of implementing, extending,
and instantiating integrated environments of both basic algorithms and systems.
Future Work. This work raises many new questions about how accessibility and integration
can play complementary roles in delivering the benefits of automated formal reasoning assistance
tools and techniques to end-users working in particular application domains. Further work is
required to determine whether the supporting languages and tools are sufficiently flexible and
expressive for integrating a wide variety of existing algorithms and automated systems.
As an example of one specific direction for future work, many other workflows and practical
tasks could be better supported by building extensions and plugins for content management
systems (CMSs). For example, a CMS may be extended with facilities that allow end-users to
test and refine formal arguments collaboratively, and to collaboratively populate a database of
domain-specific formal facts.
References
[1] A. Abel, B. Chang, and F. Pfenning. Human-readable machine-verifiable proofs for teaching
constructive logic. In U. Egly, A. Fiedler, H. Horacek, and S. Schmitt, editors, PTP ’01: IJCAR
Workshop on Proof Transformations, Proof Presentations and Complexity of Proofs, Siena, Italy,
2001.
[2] Eric Allen, David Chase, Joe Hallett, Victor Luchangco, Jan-Willem Maessen, Sukyoung Ryu,
Guy L. Steele Jr., and Sam Tobin-Hochstadt. The Fortress Language Specification Version 1.0.
March 2008.
[3] Andrea Asperti, Claudio Sacerdoti Coen, Enrico Tassi, and Stefano Zacchiroli. User interaction
with the matita proof assistant. Journal of Automated Reasoning, 39(2):109–139, 2007.
[4] Grzegorz Bancerek and Josef Urban. Integrated semantic browsing of the Mizar Mathematical
Library for authoring Mizar articles. In MKM, pages 44–57, 2004.
[5] Chad E. Brown. Verifying and Invalidating Textbook Proofs using Scunak. In MKM ’06: Mathe-
matical Knowledge Management, pages 110–123, Wokingham, England, 2006.
[6] Rod M. Burstall. Proveeasy: helping people learn to do proofs. Electr. Notes Theor. Comput.
Sci., 31:16–32, 2000.
[7] Paul Cairns and Jeremy Gow. Integrating Searching and Authoring in Mizar. Journal of Automated
Reasoning, 39(2):141–160, 2007.
[8] Levent Erko¨k and John Matthews. Pragmatic equivalence and safety checking in cryptol. In
Proceedings of the 3rd workshop on Programming languages meets program verification, PLPV ’09,
pages 73–82, New York, NY, USA, 2008. ACM.
[9] Thomas Hallgren and Aarne Ranta. An extensible proof text editor. In LPAR ’00: Proceedings
of the 7th International Conference on Logic for Programming and Automated Reasoning, pages
70–84, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2000. Springer-Verlag.
[10] Sangmok Han, David R. Wallace, and Robert C. Miller. Code completion from abbreviated input.
In ASE ’09: Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software
Engineering, pages 332–343, Washington, DC, USA, 2009. IEEE Computer Society.
11
[11] Gerard Holzmann. The SPIN Model Checker: Primer and Reference Manual. Addison-Wesley,
Boston, 2005.
[12] Vatche Ishakian, Andrei Lapets, Azer Bestavros, and Assaf Kfoury. Formal Verification of SLA
Transformations. In Proceedings of CloudPerf 2011: IEEE International Workshop on Perfor-
mance Aspects of Cloud and Service Virtualization, Washington, D.C., USA, July 2011.
[13] Daniel Jackson. Alloy: a lightweight object modelling notation. ACM Transactions on Software
Engineering and Methodology, 11(2):256–290, April 2002.
[14] Daniel Jackson. Alloy: a lightweight object modelling notation. Software Engineering and Method-
ology, 11(2):256–290, 2002.
[15] Daniel Jackson. Software Abstractions: Logic, Language, and Analysis. MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA, revised ed edition, 2012.
[16] Cezary Kaliszyk. Web interfaces for proof assistants. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer
Science, 174(2):49–61, 2007.
[17] Fairouz Kamareddine and J. B. Wells. Computerizing Mathematical Text with MathLang. Elec-
tronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, 205:5–30, 2008.
[18] Marta Kwiatkowska, Gethin Norman, and David Parker. PRISM 4.0: Verification of Probabilistic
Real-time Systems. In 23rd International Conference on Computer Aided Verification, pages 585–
591. Springer, 2011.
[19] Andrei Lapets. User-friendly Support for Common Concepts in a Lightweight Verifier. In Pro-
ceedings of VERIFY-2010: The 6th International Verification Workshop, Edinburgh, UK, July
2010.
[20] Andrei Lapets and Assaf Kfoury. A User-friendly Interface for a Lightweight Verification System.
In Proceedings of UITP’10: 9th International Workshop On User Interfaces for Theorem Provers,
Edinburgh, UK, July 2010.
[21] Greg Little and Robert C. Miller. Keyword programming in java. In ASE ’07: Proceedings of
the 22nd IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering, pages 84–93,
New York, NY, USA, 2007. ACM.
[22] Neil Mitchell. Hoogle overview. The Monad.Reader, 12:27–35, November 2008.
[23] Leonardo De Moura, Sam Owre, and N Shankar. The SAL Language Manual. Technical Report
650, SRI International, 2003.
[24] P. Rudnicki. An overview of the Mizar project. In Proceedings of the 1992 Workshop on Types
and Proofs for Programs, pages 311–332, 1992.
[25] Jo¨rg H. Siekmann, Christoph Benzmu¨ller, Armin Fiedler, Andreas Meier, and Martin Pollet. Proof
Development with OMEGA: sqrt(2) Is Irrational. In LPAR, pages 367–387, 2002.
[26] Luca Vigano. AVANTSSAR Validation Platform v2. Technical Report 216471, 2011.
[27] Markus M. Wenzel. Isabelle/Isar - A versatile environment for human-readable formal proof doc-
uments. PhD thesis, Institut fu¨r Informatik, Technische Universita¨t Mu¨nchen, 2002.
12
